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INTRODUCTION 
Since the advent of computers,1 there has been an open question of 
whether software should receive similar patent protection to that of the 
hardware it runs on and competes with, or if it should be excluded from 
patentability as an abstract idea.2 The courts have generally allowed 
for limited eligibility,3 but struggled to define the boundaries of that 
condition. Consequently, the line for patentability moves with the 
courts using a number of tests, frequently rejecting or devaluing a 
given test in favor of another.4  In a recent decision on patentable 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Throughout this Note, “computer” is defined as “an automatic electronic machine for making rapid 
calculations or controlling operations that are expressible in numerical or logical terms.” 1 SHORTER 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 476 (6th ed. 2007). It will not mean, “‘a person employed to make 
calculations’” as the Federal Circuit tried to define it. Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. 
of Can., 687 F.3d 1266, 1277–78 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 2. See generally Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). See discussion infra Part I. 
 3. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92 (allowing patentability for the use of a mathematical formula in an 
industrial process). But see Flook, 437 U.S. at 594–95 (denying patentability of a method for updating 
alarm limits); Benson, 409 U.S. at 64, 71–72 (rejecting a patent for a method of converting binary-coded 
decimal numerals into pure binary numerals). However, all three cases admit that there is the possibility 
of patentable subject matter. 
 4. The court in State Street Bank overruled the Freeman-Walter-Abele Test, noting it had “little, if 
any, applicability to determining the presence of statutory subject matter.” State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1998). At the same time, the court in State Street 
Bank set forth a “‘useful, concrete, and tangible result[s]’” test. Id. at 1373 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 
1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). The Supreme Court never accepted this test and questioned if it was even 
viable. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 136 (2006). In the case 
of In re Bilski, the Federal Circuit contemplated a new “technological arts” test, but declined to adopt it 
because it was too unclear. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. 
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). At the same time, the court named the test originally set forth in Benson 
as the machine-or-transformation test and would go on to use this test almost exclusively. Id. at 963. The 
Supreme Court would quickly reject the machine-or-transformation test as the sole standard for 
determining the patentability of inventions suspected as falling under the “abstract ideas” exception to 
patentability. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. at 3221. Nevertheless, by admitting that the machine-or-transformation 
test was a “useful and important clue” to patentability, the Supreme Court left the door open to the lower 
courts to continue using it as the only existing, accepted test. Id. at 3227. More recently, the Supreme 
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subject matter, the Supreme Court attempted to strengthen the barrier 
to patent eligibility by requiring more from the invention.5 The Federal 
Circuit applied this decision in recent cases,6 albeit while receiving 
blame for inconsistency. 7  Even the Federal Circuit itself seems 
troubled by its own decisions, as evident in its decision to vacate one 
of these opinions for an en banc rehearing.8 The problem is not a direct 
result of the Supreme Court’s most recent decision, but rather that “no 
one understands what makes an idea ‘abstract.’”9 Currently, the only 
well-defined test available—the machine-or-transformation test10—is 
losing favor with the Supreme Court,11 and has been criticized by the 
patent community. 12  This Note proposes that courts adopt an 
additional test, one whose factors incorporate the teachings of the 
Supreme Court as well as the patent community. 
This Note examines the history of patentability of abstract ideas and 
the tests that courts have used to make the determination of whether 
an invention incorporating an abstract idea is patentable. Part I 
provides a history of the four seminal cases related to patentable 
subject matter, as well as some more recent on point decisions.13 Part 
                                                                                                                 
Court again noted that the machine-or-transformation test is not the only test; however, it declined to 
accept any other test proposed. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 
1303 (2012). 
 5. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1298–99. However, as discussed, the Court refused to accept any test 
set forth by the parties. See discussion supra note 4. 
 6. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 685 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir.), vacated, 484 F. App’x 
559 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1275–76. 
 7. Dennis Crouch, Ongoing Debate: Is Software Patentable?, PATENTLYO (July 27, 2012),  
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/07/ongoing-debate-is-software-patentable.html. (“Despite this  
attempted reconciliation, it is clear that the CLS majority has a different approach to subject matter 
eligibility questions.”). 
 8. See generally Alice, 685 F.3d 1341. The court’s decision to vacate came only after the Bancorp 
decision was handed down by a different panel of Federal Circuit judges. 484 F. App’x at 559. 
 9. Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1316 (2011). See also In re 
Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1542 n.18 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[A]bstract ideas constitute disembodied concepts or 
truths which are not ‘useful’ from a practical standpoint standing alone, i.e., they are not ‘useful’ until 
reduced to some practical application.”). 
 10. The machine-or-transformation test, a test first introduced in Gottschalk v. Benson, continues to 
be used by the courts today with various degrees of success. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 11. The Court, while not rejecting the machine-or-transformation test, did de-emphasize it from the 
status of the sole test, as the Federal Circuit would use it, to being a “useful and important clue” to 
patentability. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010). 
 12. Lemley et al., supra note 9, at 1316 (calling for the complete abandonment of the machine-or-
transformation test in favor of other more relevant tests). 
 13. See discussion infra Part I. 
3
King: Software Patentability after Prometheus
Published by Reading Room, 2014
1114 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:4 
II changes focus to the various tests and factors that have been used by 
the courts, exploring the history of each, discussing the treatment by 
the Supreme Court, and determining the strengths and weaknesses of 
each.14 Based on the discussion in Part II, Part III proposes a new test 
to supplement the existing machine-or-transformation test.15 
I.   BRIEF HISTORY OF SOFTWARE PATENTABILITY 
A.   The “Four Seminal Supreme Court Precedents”16 
Generally, the well-known maxim regarding subject matter patent 
eligibility is that “anything under the sun that is made by man” is 
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C § 101.17 This section, which 
remains relatively unchanged since its origin in 1790,18 sets forth four 
categories of patentable subject matter: process, 19  machine, 20 
manufacture,21 and compositions of matter.22 However, the Supreme 
                                                                                                                 
 14. See discussion infra Part II. 
 15. See discussion infra Part III. 
 16. Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, 671 F.3d 1317, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Four seminal 
Supreme Court precedents provide guidance regarding when an invention qualifies as a patent-eligible 
process as opposed to an abstract idea . . . .”). These four seminal precedents include: Bilski v. Kappos, 
Diamond v. Diehr, Parker v. Flook, and Gottschalk v. Benson. Id. 
 17. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. at 3248 (noting Congress’s intention for statutory subject matter to “include[] 
anything under the sun that is made by man”) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 
(1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 18. See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (commenting on the history of the 
statute). One of the largest changes was made by Congress in the 1952 Patent Act, in which Congress 
replaced the word “art” with the word “process”; however, the words had been used interchangeably until 
that point. CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 157 n.2 (2d ed. 2011). 
 19. Process is defined by § 100 as a “process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known 
process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.” 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2012). Another, 
less circular, definition is a “method, operation, or series of actions intended to achieve some new and 
useful end or result by changing a material’s chemical or physical characteristics.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1325 (9th ed. 2009). 
 20. A machine is “[a] device or apparatus consisting of fixed and moving parts that work together to 
perform some function.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 1035. 
 21. Manufacture is defined as “[a] thing that is made or built by a human being (or by a machine), as 
distinguished from something that is a product of nature.” Id. at 1050. 
 22. Composition of matter is defined as a “combination[] of natural elements whether resulting from 
chemical union or from mechanical mixture, and whether the substances are gases, fluids, powders, or 
solids.” Id. at 325. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, 
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”). While the America 
Invents Act changed much of Title 35, section 101 remains unchanged. See generally Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
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Court has carved out three exceptions to these statutory categories: 
“‘laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.’”23 These 
policy-based exclusions are generally premised on the idea that a 
fundamental concept or truth is free of any reservation and therefore is 
not patentable.24 Due to the nature of the exceptions, the boundaries of 
each exception—the point at which the fundamental concept ends and 
patentable subject matter begins—is blurred and is often 
indeterminate. Every invention, at some level, builds on an exception: 
a rule of nature such as Newtonian mechanics to build a machine; a 
physical phenomenon such as using a naturally occurring mineral in 
the invention; or an abstract idea such as a mathematical formula to 
calculate when the invention should perform an action.25 The question 
thus becomes whether the patent is claiming an invention made by 
man, or is only claiming the exception through a trick of patent 
drafting, commonly known as a draftsman’s trick.26  The Supreme 
Court has provided clues in the “[f]our seminal” cases.27 
1.   Gottschalk v. Benson 
In Gottschalk v. Benson, one of the earliest cases dealing with a 
software patent, an inventor attempted to patent a computer algorithm 
that would convert decimals into binary.28 In its analysis, the Court 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, 671 F.3d 1317, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 24. In Diehr, the Court summarizes the precedents that discuss the policy for having the exclusions. 
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185–86 (1981). The Court goes on to offer what has become the textbook 
example of an unpatentable law of nature: “Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E = mc2 . . . .” 
Id. (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 25. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012) (“[A]ll 
inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or 
abstract ideas.”); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) (“The line between a patentable ‘process’ and 
an unpatentable ‘principle’ is not always clear.”). 
 26. Flook, 437 U.S. at 594 (explaining that the incorporation of unpatentable material, such as a 
mathematical formula, does not bar patentability). 
 27. Fort Props., 671 F.3d at 1320. 
 28. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972) (regarding patent application Serial No. 315,050). 
The Court describes the algorithm as follows: 
 
 The patent sought is on a method of programming a general-purpose digital computer 
to convert signals from binary-coded decimal form into pure binary form . . . . 
 The decimal system uses as digits the 10 symbols 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. The 
value represented by any digit depends, as it does in any positional system of notation, both 
on its individual value and on its relative position in the numeral. Decimal numerals are 
5
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drew a direct comparison between the invention at bar and the claimed 
invention in O’Reilly v. Morse, the telegraph case.29 In Morse, the 
Court found that the claim was not for the use of “‘electricity distinct 
from the particular process with which it [was] connected in his 
patent.’”30 Instead, the Morse patent attempted to claim all uses of 
electricity to convey a message without a limitation to a specific 
machine or apparatus.31  Without such limitation, the Court found, 
Morse not only attempted to monopolize more than he had described, 
or enabled, but also attempted to claim the concept of electromagnetic 
transmissions.32 In comparison, the Court in Benson determined that 
the formula had no other application than for a digital computer.33 This 
contradicting logic of not claiming the algorithm specifically, but 
attempting to patent all uses of the algorithm, led the Court to reject 
the claim as it would effectively patent the algorithm itself.34 Where 
Morse wanted to patent all uses of electricity to deliver a message, 
                                                                                                                 
written by placing digits in the appropriate positions or columns of the numerical sequence, 
i.e., ‘unit’ (100), ‘tens’ (101), ‘hundreds’ (102), ‘thousands’ (103), etc. Accordingly, the 
numeral 1492 signifies (1 103) (4 102) (9 101) (2 100). 
 The pure binary system of positional notation uses two symbols as digits-0 and 1, 
placed in a numerical sequence with values based on consecutively ascending powers of 2. 
In pure binary notation, what would be the tens position is the twos position; what would 
be hundreds position is the fours position; what would be the thousands position is the 
eights. Any decimal number from 0 to 10 can be represented in the binary system with four 
digits or positions . . . . 
 The BCD system using decimal numerals replaces the character for each component 
decimal digit in the decimal numeral with the corresponding four-digit binary numeral . . . . 
Thus decimal 53 is represented as 0101 0011 in BCD, because decimal 5 is equal to binary 
0101 and decimal 3 is equivalent to binary 0011. In pure binary notation, however, decimal 
53 equals binary 110101. 
 
Id. at 65–67. 
 29. Id. at 68–69; O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853). 
 30. Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (quoting Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1, 535 (1888)). 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Morse, 56 U.S. at 124. 
 33. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71 (“The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical 
application except in connection with a digital computer . . . .”). Due to this finding, the Court declared 
that the patent would potentially preempt all uses of the formula, practical and otherwise. Id. at 72. 
 34. Id. at 71–72. Even with this finding, the Court left the door open to Congress to allow the 
patentability of this sort of issue. However, Congress has yet to move in either direction. Even today, there 
are calls for Congress to take action and resolve this issue. Christal Sheppard, Solving a Knotty Problem: 
An Outrageous Call for Patent Reform Part Deux, PATENTLYO (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.patentlyo. 
com/patent/2012/08/guest-post-by-christal-sheppard-solving-a-knotty-problem-an-outrageous-call-for-
patent-reform-part-d.html. 
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Benson wanted to patent all uses of the formula to convert decimals 
into binary. In Flook, below, the Court would come to understand 
Benson as standing for the idea that “the discovery of a novel and 
useful mathematical formula may not be patented.”35 
2.   Parker v. Flook 
Shortly after Benson, the Supreme Court again addressed software 
patentability in Parker v. Flook.36 In Flook, the Court described the 
invention—a method to continuously update the desired alarm 
limit37—as a method involving three steps: 
[A]n initial step which merely measures the present value of the 
process variable (e. g., the temperature); an intermediate step 
which uses an algorithm to calculate an updated alarm-limit value; 
and a final step in which the actual alarm limit is adjusted to the 
updated value. 38 
As in Benson, the Court took issue with the invention being little more 
than the mathematical formula it encompassed.39 The inventor argued, 
and the Court conceded, that in Benson a patent would have wholly 
preempted use of the formula.40 Preemption of the formula would 
grant the inventor a monopoly over not only the invention but also the 
unpatentable mathematical formula, which was not true in Flook.41 
Other versions of the formula were already in the public domain and 
would not be affected by the outcome of the case. 42  Despite the 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978). 
 36. Id. at 585–87 (evaluating a method for updating alarm limits, which the Patent and Trademark 
Office Board of Appeals rejected as directed to unpatentable subject matter). 
 37. An “alarm limit” is a value that will trigger an alarm once exceeded. Id. at 585. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 586. Notably, the Court observed that “[t]he patent application does not purport to explain 
how to select the appropriate margin of safety,” or other variables; it only calculates the new alarm limit. 
Id. 
 40. Id. at 589–90. 
 41. Flook, 437 U.S. at 590. The respondent specially claimed that the post-solution activity 
distinguished this case from Benson. Id. 
 42. Id. at 589–90. This patent attempted to only claim use within the petrochemical and oil-refining 
industries. Id. 
7
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inventor’s arguments, the Court rejected the idea of any post-solution 
activity as a transformation for patentability.43 It pointed to a common 
mathematical formula, the Pythagorean theorem, as an idea that an 
inventor could not wholly or partially patent regardless of the final 
steps attached to it.44 Building on Benson, which restricted the ability 
to patent a formula, Flook now looked to inventions that attempted to 
patent a formula and some other activity. Any additional activity 
would not be enough to salvage the patentability of the invention; 
instead, the Court must evaluate the patent as if the formula were well 
known.45 
3.   Diamond v. Diehr 
In Diamond v. Diehr, the Court examined whether a process for 
curing rubber was patentable.46 The Court recognized that, while the 
patent was for a process and therefore presumably patentable under 
§ 101, because the process incorporated a number of mathematical 
formulas, it could fall into one of the judicial exclusions, such as a rule 
of nature.47 The inventor used a well-known formula, the Arrhenius 
equation,48 to determine when the ideal time was to open the press and 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id. at 590. In this instance, the post-solution activity was “the adjustment of the alarm limit to the 
figure computed according to the formula.” Id. While the courts never explicitly define the term “post-
solution activity,” it is generally understood to mean any activity occurring after the use of the equation, 
abstract idea, or other unpatentable concept. Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 959, 993 n.125 (1986). 
 44. Flook, 437 U.S. at 590 (claiming that “the Pythagorean theorem would not have been patentable, 
or partially patentable”). But see U.S. Patent No. 4,137,652 col.1 l.5–10 (filed Nov. 7, 1977) (issued Feb. 
6, 1979) (patenting an apparatus for verification of the Pythagorean theorem). While this patent is a 
mechanical apparatus, under the reasoning in Flook, the apparatus may be considered post-solution 
activity at the end of the formula. U.S. Patent No. 6,748,224 col.2 l.4–5 (filed Dec. 16, 1998) (issued June 
8, 2004) (patenting a local positioning system based on the Pythagorean theorem). 
 45. Flook, 437 U.S. at 590–92 (noting the concept of post-solution activity—being able to transform 
an unpatentable principle into a patentable process—was an unacceptable exaltation of form over 
substance). However, the novel structure created with the aid of some formula would still be patentable. 
Id. at 592 (“We think this case must also be considered as if the principle or mathematical formula were 
well known.”). 
 46. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981). The Court examined patent application Serial No. 
602,463 claiming an invention for a process of molding uncured rubber into cured precision products. Id. 
 47. Id. at 185. In fact, the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals rejected the claim as 
unpatentable. Id. at 175. As in both Benson and Flook, the use of a formula is the use of an abstract idea, 
one of the three exclusions to patentable subject matter. See generally Flook, 437 U.S. 584; Gottschalk v. 
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
 48. The formula is: ln v = CZ + x. The required cure time is v, C is the activation constant, Z is the 
8
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remove the cured rubber product.49 As in Benson, the Diehr invention 
was based on a well-known mathematical formula; and, similar to 
Flook, the inventor was attempting to claim that the additional activity 
in the patent claim was enough to salvage the patentability.50 However, 
despite the similarities in both Flook and Benson, the Court did not 
consider the current case to be within the recognized exceptions.51 
Instead, the Court found that the current claim, an industrial process to 
cure rubber, was “drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory.”52 In 
addition, the claim “does not become nonstatutory simply because it 
uses a mathematical formula, computer program, or digital 
computer[,]”53 in the Benson situation, a mathematical formula.54 The 
Court also found the other steps in the claim, including installation of 
the rubber into the press, closing the mold, continuously determining 
the temperature of the mold, constantly recalculating the cure time via 
a digital computer, and automatically opening the press at the correct 
time, added significant activity to the formula in terms of patent law’s 
objective.55 These additional steps, though post-solution activity, were 
significant by themselves. 
The Court in Diehr focused on the presence or absence of the post-
solution activity.56 But the Federal Circuit would go on to construe the 
Diehr decision broadly, interpreting the Supreme Court’s reasoning as 
a test of the whole claim.57 This would open a way forward for the 
courts to fully approve of software patentability in later cases. 58 
                                                                                                                 
temperature of the mold, and x is a constant based on the geometry of the mold. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177 
n.2. 
 49. Id. at 177–78. 
 50. Id. at 187. 
 51. Id. (“[T]he respondents here do not seek to patent a mathematical formula. Instead, they seek 
patent protection for a process of curing synthetic rubber.”). 
 52. Id. (drawing from Benson to note that a program servicing a computer is not patentable). 
 53. Id. (drawing from Flook to note that a law of nature or mathematical algorithm is not enough to 
exclude a process from patent protection). 
 54. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191. 
 55. Id. at 188, 192 (acknowledging the process incorporates a more efficient solution of the equation 
and that the claim is an attempt to patent an industrial process). 
 56. See generally id. at 175. 
 57. JANE C. GINSBURG & ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 216 
(2006). 
 58. Id. at 217 (noting that State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. and AT&T 
Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc. removed any doubts as to the patentability of software). 
9
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Specifically, in AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., the 
Federal Circuit clarified that Diehr is an example of how an algorithm 
could be a useful application.59 Indeed, the AT&T case upheld the 
patentability of Boolean algebraic concepts.60 
4.   Bilski v. Kappos 
When an inventor tried to patent a process for hedging investment 
risks, the U.S. Patent Board rejected the application, starting a series 
of appeals that eventually led to the Supreme Court.61  The patent 
agent, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, and the Federal 
Circuit all agreed that this process merely manipulated abstract ideas, 
and the inventor did not implement it on a specific machine or 
apparatus.62 Although the Supreme Court would go on to affirm the 
Federal Circuit, it only did so after setting aside the machine-or-
transformation test63 as the sole test for determining patent eligibility 
with respect to inventions suspected as consisting of abstract ideas.64 
The Court refused to completely denounce the test, noting that it is “a 
useful and important clue, an investigative tool,” 65  but this same 
language has allowed the Federal Circuit to continue to use the 
machine-or-transformation test as its primary test for patentability.66 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3223–24 (2010) (affirming the Federal Circuit and the Patent 
and Trademark Office’s decision that the patent application for a method of hedging risk in the field of 
commodities trading was not eligible subject matter). 
 62. Id. at 3224. 
 63. Id. at 3227 (“This Court’s precedents establish that the machine-or-transformation test is a useful 
and important clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed inventions are processes 
under § 101. The machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is 
a patent-eligible ‘process.’”). While a more complete treatment of the machine-or-transformation test is 
provided in Part II, the machine-or-transformation test is simply a determination of whether the process 
is tied to a specific machine or transforms an item from one state to another. Mayo Collaborative Servs. 
v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301 (2012); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 183 (1981). 
 64. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226–27. Here the Court pointed to precedents as establishing the test but not 
the sole test. Id. This determination has support in both Benson and Diehr. In Diehr, the Court looked to 
both Benson and Cochrane v. Deener and found that “[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a 
different state or thing’ is the clue to the patentability.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188, 184 (quoting Gottschalk 
v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972)). 
 65. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227. 
 66. Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(finding the invention failed the machine-or-transformation test and consequently was not patentable). 
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However, the Court in Bilski refused to definitively state whether any 
invention or technology was categorically unpatentable.67 The Court 
deferred that decision to the legislative branch, but suggested the 
statute, as written, allowed for a narrow area of patentability for 
business methods.68 Here, the Court found that the inventor took an 
abstract idea, reduced it to a mathematical formula, and tried to patent 
the result.69 The ability to patent the invention would be the same as 
having a monopoly over the initial abstract idea.70 In deference to its 
decision in Flook, the Court again rejected the patentability of an 
invention that is an abstract idea that happens to be limited to a 
particular field of use.71 
B.   Prometheus Sets the Standard 
After Bilski, the lower courts continued to rely heavily on the 
machine-or-transformation test.72 In Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
Prometheus Laboratories, the Federal Circuit again relied on the 
machine-or-transformation test to determine patentability.73  In that 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228 (“It is important to emphasize that the Court today is not commenting on 
the patentability of any particular invention, let alone holding that any of the above-mentioned 
technologies from the Information Age should or should not receive patent protection.”). 
 68. Id. at 3229 (“This established rule of statutory interpretation cannot be overcome by judicial 
speculation as to the subjective intent of various legislators in enacting the subsequent provision. Finally, 
while § 273 appears to leave open the possibility of some business method patents, it does not suggest 
broad patentability of such claimed inventions.”). The Court even invited the Federal Circuit to create 
new tests. Id. at 3231. (“It may be that the Court of Appeals thought it needed to make the machine-or-
transformation test exclusive precisely because its case law had not adequately identified less extreme 
means of restricting business method patents . . . . [W]e by no means foreclose the Federal Circuit’s 
development of other limiting criteria that further the purposes of the Patent Act . . . .”). Business methods 
are “a way or an aspect of a way in which a commercial enterprise is operated.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 227. 
 69. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231 (“The concept of hedging, described in claim 1 and reduced to a 
mathematical formula in claim 4, is an unpatentable abstract idea, just like the algorithms at issue in 
Benson and Flook.”). 
 70. Id. This analysis echoes the language used in Flook. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 (1978). 
 71. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231. Again, the Court rejected the post-solution components as salvaging the 
invention, noting that in this case “these claims add even less to the underlying abstract principle than the 
invention in Flook did.” Id. 
 72. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2012); Bancorp 
Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 73. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1302. Two patents were at issue in this case, U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 
and U.S. Patent No. 6,680,302. Id. at 1295. Both patents were granted and licensed to Prometheus 
Laboratories, who brought suit against Mayo Collaborative Services for infringement. Id. at 1295–96. The 
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Mayo due to the claims being directed to 
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case, the invention at issue was a process for determining the correct 
dosage of thiopurine drugs. 74  On appeal, the Supreme Court 
recognized that the invention claimed a law of nature.75 However, the 
inquiry did not end there; the Court had to determine if the claimed 
process transformed the unpatentable natural law into a patentable 
application of that law.76 When the Court looked to its own precedents, 
it found guideposts from Flook, Morse, Benson, and Bilski, which 
advised against the use of draftsman tricks77 rejected claims that were 
too broad,78 and required an inventive concept.79 Using the teachings 
from those four cases, the Court found the claims to be an excluded 
law of nature—the relationship between the thiopurine drug and the 
molecules in the patient’s blood.80 As a result, the Court found that the 
patent only included the “well-understood, routine, conventional 
activity previously engaged in by researchers in the field.” 81 
                                                                                                                 
unpatentable subject matter. Id. at 1296. The Federal Circuit reversed using the machine-or-transformation 
test to find patentability. Id. 
 74. Id. at 1294–95. It is important to note that much of the process patented here was already known 
to the scientific community. Id. at 1295. The Court specifically pointed out that “scientists already 
understood that the levels in a patient’s blood of certain metabolites . . . correlated with the likelihood that 
a particular dosage of a thiopurine drug could cause harm or prove ineffective.” Id. Thiopurine drugs are 
composed of azathioprine, 6-mercaptopurine, and 6-thioguanine. Srikumar Sahasranaman et al., Clinical 
Pharmacology and Pharmacogenetics of Thiopurines, 64 EUR. J. CLINCAL PHARMACOLOGY 753, 753 
(2008). They are commonly prescribed to treat chronic inflammatory diseases. Id. 
 75. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1296 (stating that “Prometheus’ patents set forth laws of nature”). 
However, the Court also recognized that “all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or 
apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.” Id. at 1293. “[A] process is not unpatentable 
simply because it contains a law of nature or a mathematical algorithm.” Id. (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 
450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 76. Id. at 1294 (“[T]o transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of 
such a law, one must do more than simply state the law of nature while adding the words ‘apply it.’ . . . We 
must determine whether the claimed processes have transformed these unpatentable natural laws into 
patent-eligible applications of those laws.”). 
 77. Id. The Court looked to Flook for admonishment of patent statute interpretations that would lead 
to draftsman’s tricks. Id. Draftsman’s tricks refer to any attempt at obtaining a patent or avoiding a 
rejection by drafting the claims in a manner to disguise the actual subject. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 
63, 72 (1972). 
 78. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1294. The Court followed Morse and Benson’s teachings to not uphold 
a patent that would broadly preempt the use of the unpatentable subject. Id. 
 79. Id. From Flook and Bilski, the Court understood that a process that includes a natural law may still 
be patentable if it has an “inventive concept” that ensures the patent amounts to more than just the natural 
law. Id. The idea of an “inventive concept” has not been an integral part of recent patent law. See 
discussion infra Part II.B. 
 80. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1296. 
 81. Id. at1294. 
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According to the Court, the patent was on the administration of the 
drug; the patient then tells the doctor about the law of nature; and 
finally it includes a step that instructs the doctor to determine the 
amount of metabolite molecules in the blood.82 Due to the nature of 
these steps, the Court held, the patent would disproportionately tie up 
the underlying natural law83 and, without some additional claim that 
was not a well-known conventional activity, the patent’s only unique 
concept was a law of nature.84 The process in Diehr, which was found 
patentable, contained steps that were not “in context obvious, already 
in use, or purely conventional[,]” while the steps in Prometheus did 
include activities that were not well understood at the time.85 
While Prometheus looked specifically at a law of nature exclusion 
and not an abstract idea, the Supreme Court has already used the 
holding to remand cases dealing with abstract ideas,86 and the Federal 
Circuit has used the reasoning in analyzing software cases.87 In the 
wake of the Court’s decision in Prometheus, several cases were 
remanded for reconsideration based on the new holding.88 Recently, 
the Federal Circuit issued decisions in the case of CLS Bank v. Alice 
Corporation 89  and Bancorp Services v. Sun Life. 90  Despite 
Prometheus not directly addressing software patents or abstract ideas, 
the Supreme Court addressed, and rejected, the Federal Circuit’s test 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Id. at 1297–98. 
 83. Id. at 1294. However, the Court would later claim “those in the field did not know the precise 
correlations between metabolite levels and likely harm or ineffectiveness.” Id. at 1295. 
 84. Id. at 1296. 
 85. Id. at 1299. 
 86. See, e.g., Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. 
Wildtangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012). 
 87. See generally Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 
2012). 
 88. See generally Ultramercial, 132 S. Ct. 2431; Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U. S. Patent and 
Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012). 
 89. See generally CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 685 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir.), vacated, 
484 F. App’x 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012). While the Supreme Court did not remand this case, the decision is 
directly influenced by the discussion in Prometheus. Id. In Prometheus, the Supreme Court reversed the 
Federal Circuit for a second time, pointing out that the Federal Circuit’s test for subject matter 
patentability was insufficient. Id. at 1356 (Prost, J., dissenting). 
 90. Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1266. Similar to Alice, this case was not remanded by the Supreme Court. 
However, the timing of the Prometheus decision and the reasoning cited in the case show that the Federal 
Circuit is treating both cases under the new Prometheus guidance. Id. 
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for subject matter eligibility, which it used not only in law of nature 
cases but abstract idea cases as well. 
1.   CLS Bank International v. Alice Corporation 
In Alice, the Federal Circuit evaluated a patent claiming a computer 
system for exchanging obligations between two parties using a trusted 
third party.91 However, shortly after the court issued its decision, it 
vacated it for an en banc rehearing.92 The following section discusses 
the original decision as it relates to Bancorp and shows the court’s 
reasoning at the time. A discussion of the more recent en banc decision 
follows in a subsequent section. 
a.   Alice Panel Decision 
To determine if the inventor directed the claim of the patent to a 
patent-eligible subject matter, the court focused on the concept of 
preemption. 93  The court took guidance from Bilski, Morse, and 
Benson, each holding that if the abstract idea preempts use in all other 
fields, then it works as a monopoly over the entire idea.94 Looking to 
the machine-or-transformation test, the court questioned if a machine 
sufficiently limited the patent in some meaningful way.95 The court 
used this second question to satisfy the first.96 The fact that the patent 
was limited to a computer implementation meant the patent did not 
preempt all other fields of use.97 However, this reasoning and the 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Alice, 685 F.3d at 1343. The court is evaluating patents 5,970,479; 6,912,510; 7,149,720; and 
7,725,375, all of which are owned by Alice Corporation. Id. The district court ruled the patents invalid 
for failure to claim patent-eligible subject matter. Id. at 1345. 
 92. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 484 F. App’x 559, 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 93. Alice, 685 F.3d at 1349. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 1350 (“In determining whether a claim is directed to a non-statutory abstract idea, the 
Supreme Court acknowledged this court’s ‘machine-or-transformation test [as] a useful and important 
clue, an investigative tool,’ but not as a dispositive test.”) (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 
3227 (2010)). 
 96. Id. at 1355–56. 
 97. Id. (“It is clear, moreover, that the limitations . . . do not appear to preempt much in the way of 
innovation. While the use of a machine in these limitations is less substantial or limiting than the industrial 
uses examined in Diehr (curing rubber) or Alappat (a rasterizer), the presence of these limitations prevents 
us from finding it manifestly evident that the claims are patent ineligible . . . .”). 
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heavy reliance on the machine-or-transformation test drew criticism 
from the dissent.98 
b.   Alice En Banc Decision 
The Federal Circuit vacated the panel’s decision in Alice in order to 
hear it en banc hoping to “ameliorate [the] uncertainty by providing 
objective standards for section 101.”99 However, the court was unable 
to agree on a single standard, instead “propound[ing] at least three 
incompatible standards, devoid of consensus, serving simply to add to 
the unreliability.”100 In total, the court issued six different opinions, 
and while equally divided on almost every point, a majority agreed that 
the method and related computer claims were “not directed to eligible 
subject matter.”101 
In an opinion filed by Judge Lourie, he examined the Supreme 
Court’s opinions, including Benson, Flook, Diehr, Bilski, and 
Prometheus. 102  From this analysis, he took away three common 
themes: “patents should not be allowed to preempt the fundamental 
tools of discovery”; 103  a warning “against overly formalistic 
approaches to subject-matter eligibility that invite manipulation by 
patent applicants”; 104  and a desire for a “flexible, claim-by-claim 
approach to subject-matter eligibility that avoids rigid line 
drawing.” 105  Judge Lourie went on to outline the process for 
determining whether a computer-implemented claim is directed to 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Id. at 1356–57 (Prost, J., dissenting) (“The majority resists the Supreme Court’s unanimous 
directive to apply the patentable subject matter test with more vigor. Worse yet, it creates an entirely new 
framework that in effect allows courts to avoid evaluating patent eligibility under § 101 whenever they so 
desire. . . . As mentioned, however, the majority does not even attempt to inquire whether the claims 
disclose anything inventive. The bulk of the analysis focuses on the fact that the claims require ‘computer 
implementation,’ which the majority itself deems insufficient to pass muster under § 101.”). 
 99. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Newman, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1273 (per curiam). There are only five opinions officially, but Chief Judge Rader wrote 
separately under a heading of “Additional Reflections filed by RADER, Chief Judge” wherein he 
described how an analysis should be conducted. Id. at 1333–36 (Rader, J., additional reflections). 
 102. Id. at 1277–80 (Lourie, J.). Judge Lourie’s opinion was also joined by Judge Dyk, Prost, Reyna, 
and Wallach. Id. at 1273. 
 103. Id. at 1280. 
 104. Id. at 1281. 
 105. Alice, 717 F.3d at 1281. 
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subject matter that is patent-eligible under § 101.106 First, the claim 
must fall within one of the four statutory categories: process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter.107 Once the statutory category 
has been established, the focus turns to the judicial exceptions, and 
whether the claim preempts one of the exceptions.108 Judge Lourie 
rejected the idea of a supposed requirement that a patent must exhibit 
inventiveness if the term has the same meaning as used for § 102 and 
§ 103.109 Instead, the inventive concept requirement for § 101 only 
means “a genuine human contribution to the claimed subject matter[,]” 
one that is “more than a trivial appendix to the underlying abstract 
idea.”110 Based on this definition of “inventive concept,” he rejected 
the patent in question finding that the limitations added nothing to the 
substance of the claim.111 
Chief Judge Rader wrote two separate opinions, the first to concur-
in-part, 112  and the second to provide “additional reflections.” 113 
Whereas Judge Lourie looked to Supreme Court cases, Judge Rader 
looked to the statute, detailing the history of the relevant language, 
especially concerning “invention.” 114  Both judges agreed that the 
eligibility inquiry in § 101 “is not an inquiry into obviousness, novelty, 
enablement, or any other patent law concept.” 115  However, Judge 
Rader eventually found that the claims were directed to an abstract 
concept—the use of an escrow to avoid risk.116 Each of the claim 
elements did little more than to recite steps in the abstract concept. The 
                                                                                                                 
 106. Id. at 1282. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 1283. 
 111. Alice, 717 F.3d at 1286. 
 112. Id. at 1292. The Chief Judge was joined by Judges Linn, Moore, and O’Malley. Id. 
 113. Id. at 1333 (Rader, C.J., additional reflections). Here the Chief Judge is not joined by any other 
judges, and this does not appear to be an actual opinion, but truly contemplations by the Chief Judge. 
 114. Id. at 1294 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). (“We begin with the text of the 
statute.”). This is also the focus of Judge Rader’s additional reflections: “Thus, I find myself writing again 
as I did in 1992. And I find myself resorting to exactly the same phrase: When all else fails, consult the 
statute!” Id. at 1335 (Rader, C.J., additional reflections). 
 115. Id. at 1302 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 116. Id. at 1312. 
16
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 8
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol30/iss4/8
2014] SOFTWARE PATENTABILITY AFTER PROMETHEUS 1127 
claim here was “indistinguishable from the [ineligible] claim in 
Bilski.”117 
In a dissent filed by Judge Moore, he expressed concern over the 
analysis and the outcome, claiming “this case is the death of hundreds 
of thousands of patents, including all business method, financial 
system, and software patents as well as many computer implemented 
and telecommunications patents.” 118  While the flaw in the other 
opinions was clear for Judge Moore—they “trample[d] upon a 
mountain of precedent”119—the correct analysis was even simpler: 
“But if meaningfully tying a method to a machine can be an important 
indication of patent-eligibility, how can a claim to the machine itself, 
with all its structural and functional limitations, not be patent-
eligible?”120 He went on to note that a machine is a concrete thing, not 
an abstract idea.121 And while software is not so concrete, its only 
purpose is to “effectively rewire[] a computer, making it a special 
purpose device capable of performing operations it was not previously 
able to perform.”122 This led Judge Moore to find at least the systems 
claims eligible.123 
In his opinion, Judge Newman proposed three principles: (1) “[t]he 
court should hold that section 101 is an inclusive statement of patent-
eligible subject matter”;124 (2) [t]he court should hold that the form of 
the claim does not determine section 101 eligibility”;125 and (3) “[t]he 
court should confirm that experimental use of patented information is 
not barred.”126 The first principle would do away with the other criteria 
such as the judicial exceptions.127 As long as the subject matter of a 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Alice, 717 F.3d at 1312 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 118. Id. at 1313 (Moore, J., dissenting in part). 
 119. Id. at 1314. 
 120. Id. (emphasis in the original). 
 121. Id. at 1316. 
 122. Id. at 1317. 
 123. Alice, 717 F.3d at 1321. 
 124. Id. at 1322 (Newman, J., concurring in-part and dissenting in part). While this appears to be a 
bright-line test—eligibility based purely on whether the claim is within an eligible subject matter—Judge 
Newman specifically notes that a bright-line test is unavailable to this area of the law. Id. at 1321. Indeed, 
Judge Newman claims that such a test is unnecessary. Id. 
 125. Id. at 1322. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. Judge Newman goes on to note that if this principle is followed, then “an all-purpose definition 
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patent falls within a statutory class, eligibility exists.128 Other sections, 
such as §§ 102, 103, and 112, would duly handle issues with breadth 
of a claim. 129  The second principle goes directly to the Supreme 
Court’s bar on draftsman’s tricks. 130  The third principle would 
“remove the doubts we have sown[,]” 131  and provide a right to 
“experiment with the information disclosed in patents.”132 Based on 
these principles, Judge Newman would have found all the claims 
eligible under § 101.133 
Judge Linn authored an opinion finding fault with the opinions of 
both Chief Judge Rader and Judge Lourie because they ignored the 
record of the case. 134  The record, while always important, was 
especially important in this case since it revealed limitations on the 
claims.135  Based on these limitations and a narrow reading of the 
judicial exception, Judge Linn would have found all claims as patent-
eligible.136 
2.   Bancorp Services, L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. 
Less than a month after the decision in Alice, the Federal Circuit 
decided Bancorp.137 There, the court examined a patent on a system of 
administering and tracking the value of life insurance policies that are 
held in separate accounts, including corporate-owned and bank-owned 
                                                                                                                 
of ‘abstractness’ or ‘preemption,’” is not needed. Id. 
 128. Id. at 1326. However, Judge Newman relies on legislative intent. Id. The exceptions are not new 
and have survived several legislative revisions, the most recent of which occurred in 2011. See generally 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 129. Alice, 717 F.3d at 1326 (Newman, J., concurring in-part and dissenting in part). 
 130. Id. at 1322. See also discussion infra Part II.A. 
 131. Alice, 717 F.3d at 1325 (Newman, J., concurring in-part and dissenting in part). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 1327. 
 134. Id. (Linn, J., dissenting) (noting that the opinions “suffer from the same flaw: they are divorced 
from the record to which we are bound.”). Judge Linn was joined by Judge O’Malley. Id. 
 135. Id. at 1328. Judge Linn noted that throughout the record, CLS stipulated a favorable claim 
construction for Alice. Id. This stipulation resulted in an electronic implementation being read into every 
claim. Id. 
 136. Id. at 1333. 
 137. Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012). This 
case started as one of infringement, but the district court invalidated all claims. Id. at 1272. The court of 
appeals reversed and remanded. Id. The district court invalidated the claims again based on the ruling in 
Bilski. Id. The 2012 Bancorp decision addressed the appeal from that ruling. Id. at 1273. 
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accounts.138 The fact that the system was implemented on, and limited 
to, a computer was not enough to convince the court that the claims 
were patent-eligible.139 The court required that the computer act as an 
integral part of the claimed invention, something that would facilitate 
the process in a way that a human could not.140 The computer was only 
employed for the most basic functions and did not impose any 
meaningful limitations on the claims. 141  The court compared the 
claims to those in Bilski and found “no material difference.”142 In both 
cases, the court found the claims did not affect a transformation, and 
the computer implementation only made the process more efficient.143 
The key difference between the holding in Bancorp and the holding in 
Alice is that, in Alice, the court was able to show that the computer 
provided a significant limitation—a computer that created and 
maintained shadow records144—whereas in Bancorp the computer was 
                                                                                                                 
 138. Id. at 1269. Patents 5,926,792 and 7,249,037 were specifically at issue. Both patents are owned by 
Bancorp. Id. The court described the invention in the following terms: 
 
The asserted patents disclose specific formulae for determining the values required to 
manage a stable value protected life insurance policy. For example, the specification 
discloses creating and initializing a fund by performing particular “calculations and 
comparisons” to determine an “initial unit value of the policy.” The specification then 
discloses “processing [that] is required at regular intervals to track existing funds.” Such 
processing includes the calculation of “fees” for the individuals who manage the life 
insurance policy That processing also includes the computation of values used for 
determining “surrender value protection investment credits,” which, as we previously 
explained, “means the difference between the actual value of a protected investment and 
the targeted return value of that investment at the time the protected life insurance policy 
is surrendered.” Those computations include the concept of a “targeted return” . . . . 
 
Id. at 1270 (citations omitted). 
 139. Id. at 1278 (“The computer required by some of Bancorp’s claims is employed only for its most 
basic function, the performance of repetitive calculations, and as such does not impose meaningful limits 
on the scope of those claims.”). 
 140. Id. (“To salvage an otherwise patent-ineligible process, a computer must be integral to the claimed 
invention, facilitating the process in a way that a person making calculations or computations could not.”). 
Unfortunately, the courts never explain how a computer can “facilitate[e] the process in a way that a 
person . . . could not.” Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1278 (“As in Bilski, the claims do not effect [sic] a transformation, and the 
fact that the required calculations could be performed more efficiently via a computer does not materially 
alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.”). 
 144. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 685 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir.), vacated, 484 F. App’x 
559 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
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not found to play a significant part in any of the claims, but was only 
used to process the information more quickly.145 
3.   What is an Abstract Idea? 
The common problem in determining whether an invention is 
claiming an abstract idea or patent-eligible subject matter is that “no 
one understands what makes an idea ‘abstract’ . . . .”146 This is due, in 
part, to a lack of clarity about the line between software and non-
software patents.147 The Federal Circuit proposed a definition of an 
abstract idea as “disembodied concepts or truths which are not ‘useful’ 
from a practical standpoint standing alone,”148 “as anything that does 
not meet the Bilski machine-or-transformation test[,]” 149  and a 
“disqualifying characteristic [that] should exhibit itself so manifestly 
as to override the broad statutory categories of eligible subject matter 
and the statutory context that directs primary attention on the 
patentability criteria of the rest of the Patent Act.”150  The second 
definition is inconsistent with Bilski and Prometheus.151 The first is not 
helpful.152 The third definition has not gained traction in the courts and 
does little to move the definition forward. A number of proposals have 
been set forth, by the courts and the patent community, in an effort to 
provide a new way of testing whether an invention is directed to an 
abstract idea or patent-eligible subject matter. 
                                                                                                                 
 145. Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1280. 
 146. Lemley et al., supra note 9, at 1316. 
 147. Id. at 1327 (“There is no clear division between ‘software’ and ‘nonsoftware’ patents, or a 
computer system that implements a ‘business method’ and one that implements another type of process, 
or between ‘technological’ and ‘nontechnological’ inventions.”). 
 148. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1542 n.18 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 149. In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Newman, J., concurring). 
 150. Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 151. In both Bilski and Prometheus, the Court explicitly rejected the machine-or-transformation test as 
the sole test for patentability. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 
(2012) (“[T]he ‘machine or transformation test’ is not a definitive test of patent eligibility, but only an 
important and useful clue.”); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221 (2010) (“The machine-or-
transformation test is not the sole test for patent eligibility under § 101.”). 
 152. All inventions have a usefulness requirement under § 101, so to require an invention to be useful 
as part of the subject matter threshold is to require the invention to fulfill the utility obligation twice and 
does not address any other statutory requirements. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
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One suggestion is to abandon the machine-or-transformation test 
completely,153 and instead, frame the question as whether the claims 
are too broad, rather than directed to an idea that is too abstract.154 The 
underlying theory suggests that the broader a claim is the more general 
and abstract it becomes and the more likely it is to restrict future 
inventions.155 However, the Court in Prometheus appeared to reject 
this theory, at least in some situations.156 
In Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, the Federal Circuit proposed 
another test.157 This test would evaluate two factors in determining 
patentability: (1) the complexity of the computer program, i.e., how 
intricate and complex creation of the software program was; and (2) 
whether the invention required an Internet website. 158  While the 
Supreme Court has not commented on this test, the patent community 
raised well-founded criticism as software complexity can be 
artificially induced.159 
Finally, another proposal is that courts focus on the method by 
which the patentee achieves his goal: looking to the actual algorithms, 
procedures, and methods in the software.160  This, however, would 
affect a large-scale change in how software is patented and evaluated 
                                                                                                                 
 153. Lemley et al., supra note 9, at 1317 (advocating the rejection of the machine-or-transformation 
test for being ambiguous). 
 154. Mark Lemley proposes a five-factor test asking whether: (1) “the claimed invention [is] potentially 
generative of many kinds of new inventions[;]” (2) “the industry rel[ies] heavily on cumulative 
invention[;]” (3) “the technological field [is] fast-moving[;]” (4) “the patentee disclosed a small number 
of embodiments but claimed a broad inventive principle[;]” and (5) “the patentee made an important 
contribution relative to the prior art[.]” Id. at 1341. 
 155. Id. at 1337–38. 
 156. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1303 (“[E]ven a narrow law of nature . . . can inhibit future research.”). 
 157. Patent Law—Patentable Subject Matter—Federal Circuit Applies New Factors in Deciding 
Patentability of a Computer Program, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2167, 2168 (2012) [hereinafter Deciding 
Patentability]. 
 158. Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 159. Deciding Patentability, supra note 157, at 2168 (“[A] requirement of complex programming is not 
a useful indicator. Programming complexity does not separate out abstract from nonabstract 
programs . . . .”). The International Obfuscated C Code Contest is an annual contest to write the most 
obfuscated and obscure code possible, much of which requires intentional and artificial introduction of 
complexity into an otherwise simple program. See INT’L OBFUSCATED C CODE CONTEST, 
http://www.ioccc.org/index.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2014). This contest demonstrates that a judicial test 
of complexity could turn software programming into an extension of draftsmen tricks as discussed in Part 
II. See discussion infra Part II. 
 160. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 
WIS. L. REV. 905 (2013). 
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by the courts, requiring courts to become experts in the area of 
software design and programing. 
II.   AN EXAMINATION OF THE TESTS AND FACTORS USED BY THE 
COURTS 
While the machine-or-transformation test is the primary test used by 
the courts to determine if an invention is directed to patentable subject 
matter, it is not the only test proposed or used by the courts.161 This 
section examines several of these tests and the factors that originated 
from the courts’ attempts at creating a new test subsequent to Bilski. 
A.   Machine-or-Transformation 
The machine-or-transformation test is, at its core, a determination 
of whether the process is tied to a specific machine,162 or transforms 
an item from one state to another.163 This test received the Supreme 
Court’s initial approval in Gottschalk v. Benson.164 Since that case, it 
has been the only test the Supreme Court has not completely 
rejected.165 However, even with this longevity, the Court166 and the 
                                                                                                                 
 161. See supra note 4. 
 162. See generally Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). The Court initially described the 
invention as: 
 
Respondents filed in the Patent Office an application for an invention which was described 
as being related ‘to the processing of data by program and more particularly to the 
programmed conversion of numerical information’ in general-purpose digital computers. 
They claimed a method for converting binary-coded decimal (BCD) numerals into pure 
binary numerals. The claims were not limited to any particular art or technology, to any 
particular apparatus or machinery, or to any particular end use. 
 
Id. at 64. The Court goes on to discuss how an invention may be patentable even without a machine 
limitation but did not find that to be the case in the instant facts. Id. at 70–73. 
 163. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 183 (1981) (“‘A process is a mode of treatment of certain 
materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to 
be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.’”) (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 
787–88 (1877)). 
 164. The Court refused to take the position that a process would not qualify if it was not tied to a 
particular machine or transformed to another form. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71. At the same time, the Court 
implied that if a process did meet one of those criteria, it would qualify. Id. 
 165. See supra note 4. 
 166. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 (2012) (opposing the 
idea that the machine-or-transformation test “trumps the ‘law of nature’ exclusion”); Bilski v. Kappos, 
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patent community167 have criticized it. Since Bilski v. Kappos, the 
Court explicitly rejected the idea that the machine-or-transformation 
test is the only test available to the lower courts.168 While the Court 
could have made the machine-or-transformation test the safe-haven of 
patentability, it relegated the test to an “important and useful clue” 
instead.169 The lower courts continue to use it as the premier test,170 
partly because no other tests have survived Supreme Court review.171 
However, this does not come without a cost. In Bilski and Prometheus, 
the Supreme Court overturned two Federal Circuits decisions, both of 
which incorporated reasoning based on the machine-or-transformation 
test.172 In both instances, the Supreme Court found the test insufficient 
for modern inventions.173 Even so, the Court continues to define the 
test as an “important and useful clue” in determining patentable subject 
matter.174 
                                                                                                                 
130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226 (2010) (rejecting the machine-or-transformation test as the sole test because it 
violates statutory interpretation principles). 
 167. Lemley et al., supra note 9, at 1315 (urging rejection of the machine-or-transformation test). 
 168. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1303; Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226. In rejecting the machine-or-
transformation test as the sole test, the Court cited precedent to show that it was never meant to be the 
sole test. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226. 
 169. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226. The Court attacked the use of the test on several levels. First, the Court 
criticized the test as violating statutory interpretation principles: “Adopting the machine-or-transformation 
test as the sole test for what constitutes a ‘process’ (as opposed to just an important and useful clue) 
violates these statutory interpretation principles.” Id. Next, the Court attacked the idea that the test was 
ever meant to be an exclusive test: “The Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that this Court has 
endorsed the machine-or-transformation test as the exclusive test.” Id. More recent cases, however, have 
rejected the broad implications of this dictum; and, in all events, later authority shows that it was not 
intended to be an exhaustive or exclusive test. Id. 
 170. See Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 
2012). 
 171. See supra note 4. 
 172. In Bliski, the Court declined to use the machine-or-transformation test to determine if a business 
method patent for risk hedging was patentable; instead, the Court looked at whether the patent would 
preempt the use of the formula. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226–28. Similarly, in Prometheus the Court again 
declined the use of the machine-or-transformation test in favor of evaluating the other activity in the 
patent. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1303. 
 173. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1303 (“Regardless, in stating that the ‘machine-or-transformation’ test 
is an ‘important and useful clue’ to patentability, we have neither said nor implied that the test trumps the 
‘law of nature’ exclusion.”); Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227 (“The machine-or-transformation test may well 
provide a sufficient basis for evaluating processes similar to those in the Industrial Age—for example, 
inventions grounded in a physical or other tangible form. But there are reasons to doubt whether the test 
should be the sole criterion for determining the patentability of inventions in the Information Age.”). 
 174. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1303; Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226. 
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There are calls for the complete abandonment of the test,175 as the 
test is criticized for being ambiguous and creating as many 
uncertainties as it solves.176 Despite its shortcomings, the machine-or-
transformation test continues to be the only test that the Supreme Court 
has not struck down.177 It currently acts as a safe haven in the sea of 
patent uncertainty—if an inventor can tie the invention to a machine, 
or affect a material transformation, then courts are more prone to find 
it directed to patentable subject matter.178 
B.   Inventive Concept 
While determining patentability, the Court in Parker v. Flook 
looked for an “inventive concept” in addition to the formula 
claimed. 179  The Court described the “inventive concept” as some 
activity worthy of patent protection without the underlying 
mathematical formula, asking if the invention did not incorporate the 
formula, would it still be patentable?180 The respondent argued that the 
theory of an inventive concept belonged to a § 102 novelty 
requirement 181  or a § 103 non-obvious requirement 182  analysis; 183 
however, the Court found this argument unpersuasive.184 Instead, it 
                                                                                                                 
 175. Lemley et al., supra note 9, at 1315 (supporting rejection of the machine-or-transformation test). 
 176. Id. at 1322 (“The machine-or-transformation test is problematic. It contains a number of 
ambiguities, leads to some bizarre results, and poorly tracks the stated goal of preventing the patenting of 
abstract ideas.”). The ambiguities are succinctly rephrased as a question of: “Does the machine-or-
transformation test apply only to process claims?” Id. 
 177. See supra note 4. 
 178. Note that in Prometheus, the Supreme Court did not hold that the invention created a 
transformation but was still unpatentable; instead, the Court did not find a transformation, and therefore, 
the invention did not satisfy the machine-or-transformation test and was not directed to patentable subject 
matter. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1305. 
 179. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) (“[T]he discovery of such a phenomenon cannot support 
a patent unless there is some other inventive concept in its application.”). 
 180. Id. at 592 (“We think this case must also be considered as if the principle or mathematical formula 
were well known.”). 
 181. 35 U.S.C. § 102 requires the invention to be “novel” through a series of conditions that determine 
if the invention is known at the time. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 182. 35 U.S.C. § 103 requires the invention to be non-obvious to “a person having ordinary skill in the 
art.” 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
 183. Flook, 437 U.S. at 592. This argument is similar to Lemley’s argument used against claim 
broadness with § 112. See infra note 212. 
 184. Flook, 437 U.S. at 592 (“Respondent argues that this approach improperly imports into § 101 the 
considerations of ‘inventiveness’ which are the proper concerns of §§ 102 and 103. This argument is based 
on two fundamental misconceptions.”). 
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insisted that a well-known unpatentable formula might still be 
patentable if it was claimed in an inventive application.185 
While not stated in the Flook case, the idea of an inventive concept 
has two desirable effects. First, it removes the question of whether the 
formula itself is patentable. While an abstract idea is often described 
as a mathematical formula, if the formula is removed from 
consideration, then the court does not have to deal with the issue of 
whether the formula is an abstract idea or something more concrete. 
Second, the court can require an additional patentable component as a 
part of the invention. With this change in focus, the question becomes: 
is the inventive concept patentable? If not, then the entire invention 
fails. In Flook the Supreme Court found each component of the 
invention obvious and well known.186 Once the Court considered the 
method well known, the rest of the invention failed to be patentable.187 
Problems quickly arose with this theory. In Diamond v. Diehr, the 
dissent noted that the Court of Appeals regularly criticized the 
inventive concept requirement, especially for mixing the unrelated 
provisions of § 101 and 102. 188  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
moved forward defending it. Given the popularity of the machine-or-
transformation test, the Supreme Court tied the concept back into the 
machine-or-transformation test claiming “it was clear that 
patentability could not be predicated upon a mental step. Under the 
‘function of a machine’ doctrine, a process which amounted to nothing 
more than a description of the function of a machine was 
unpatentable.”189 However, the dissent in Diehr in turn criticized the 
majority for not properly applying Flook and the inventive concept 
                                                                                                                 
 185. Id. at 594 (“Even though a phenomenon of nature or mathematical formula may be well known, 
an inventive application of the principle may be patented. Conversely, the discovery of such a 
phenomenon cannot support a patent unless there is some other inventive concept in its application.”). 
 186. Id. (“Here it is absolutely clear that respondent’s application contains no claim of patentable 
invention.”). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 204 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]n general Flook was not 
enthusiastically received by that court. In In re Bergy, . . . the majority engaged in an extensive critique 
of Flook, concluding that this Court had erroneously commingled ‘distinct statutory provisions which are 
conceptually unrelated.’”) (quoting In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 959 (1979)). 
 189. Id. at 195–96. 
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requirement, commenting that it had done no better than the lower 
courts.190 
The Court revived this concept in Prometheus, but made no attempt 
to expand on the theory or address the criticisms.191 Despite the limited 
analysis by the Court, it provided a clue as to where an inventive 
concept becomes important. The Court noted that the inventive activity 
in Prometheus was stronger than that in Flook but not as strong as in 
Diehr.192 In the end, it would not be enough to save the patent,193 so 
the range between the patent-eligible invention in Diehr and 
unpatentability narrowed, even if by a small margin of the 
unpatentable process claimed in Prometheus. 
C.   Draftsman’s Tricks 
The Supreme Court diligently guards against any tests or factors that 
could be easily circumvented by a “draftsman’s trick.”194 Starting in 
Benson, when the Court struggled with the question of whether 
software should be patentable, it recognized that patents were being 
issued indirectly through drafting tricks.195 In Flook, the Court rejected 
the notion that implementing an idea in some specific fashion was 
enough to result in patentability.196 This, according to the Court, would 
simply depend on draftsman’s art. 197  Again in Diehr, the Court 
                                                                                                                 
 190. Id. at 211 (“The Court misapplies Parker v. Flook because, like the [lower court], it fails to 
understand or completely disregards the distinction between the subject matter of what the inventor claims 
to have discovered . . . and the question whether that claimed discovery is in fact novel . . . .”). 
 191. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012). The Court 
explained that it examined the claims in light of the precedents, one of which requires the claims to 
incorporate an “inventive concept.” Id. Then the Court stated that the invention did not fulfill this 
requirement and moved on without much additional analysis. Id. 
 192. Id. at 1299 (“The claim before us presents a case for patentability that is weaker than the (patent-
eligible) claim in Diehr and no stronger than the (unpatentable) claim in Flook.”). 
 193. Id. at 1305 (invalidating the claims of Prometheus’s patents). 
 194. Id. at 1294; Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978); Gottschalk v. 
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972). 
 195. Benson, 409 U.S. at 72 (“Indirect attempts to obtain patents and avoid the rejection, by drafting 
claims as a process, or a machine or components thereof . . . have confused the issue further and should 
not be permitted.”). 
 196. Flook, 437 U.S. at 593 (“[R]espondent incorrectly assumes that if a process application 
implements a principle in some specific fashion, it automatically falls within the patentable subject matter 
of § 101 . . . .”). 
 197. Id. (“It would make the determination of patentable subject matter depend simply on the 
draftsman’s art and would ill serve the principles underlying the prohibition against patents for ‘ideas’ or 
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attacked “insignificant post-solution activity” as enabling a talented 
draftsman to evade any patentability limitations. 198  Prometheus 
acknowledged this idea, but did not dwell on it for long.199 
Unfortunately, the longstanding restriction on draftsman’s tricks is 
not helpful in determining patentability. Instead, it is useful in 
determining the validity of a factor in testing for patentability. If a 
draftsman’s trick can satisfy the factor, then it is not a valid factor. 
Consequently, any new factor or test must be tested through the lens 
of susceptibility to the art of draftsmen. 
D.   Claim Broadness 
The Court in Prometheus considered the breadth of the patent’s 
claims as a point of discussion when determining eligibility.200 This 
guidance originally came from both Morse and Benson.201 In Morse 
the Court rejected the invention for broadly attempting to claim all uses 
of electricity to transmit messages, 202  while in Benson the Court 
considered whether the claim was so broad as to preempt the 
formula.203 The Court also looked to contemporary commentators that 
supported such a factor.204 
In Life after Bilski, the authors advocated a multifactor test to 
determine if a claim was drafted too broadly.205 The factors set forth 
are policy-focused, evaluating: (1) whether the invention has the 
potential to generate many kinds of new inventions; 206  (2) if the 
industry tends to rely on cumulative inventions; 207  (3) how fast-
                                                                                                                 
phenomena of nature.”). 
 198. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92 (“[I]nsignificant post-solution activity will not transform an 
unpatentable principle into a patentable process.”). 
 199. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1294. 
 200. Id. (“[The Court’s precedents] warn us against upholding patents that claim processes that too 
broadly preempt the use of a natural law.”). 
 201. Id. 
 202. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 US 62, 101–02 (1853). 
 203. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972). 
 204. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1301–02 (referencing Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. 
L. REV. 1315 (2011)). 
 205. See generally Lemley et al., supra note 9 (setting forth a new test). 
 206. Id. at 1341. 
 207. Id. 
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moving the technological field is;208 (4) the number of embodiments 
disclosed by the inventor in relation to how broad the inventive 
principle is;209 and (5) the contribution of the inventor relative to the 
prior art.210 Similar to the arguments set out in defense of the inventive 
concept, commentators draw a distinction between broadness analysis 
under 35 U.S.C. § 112 and analysis under § 101.211 The focus of § 112 
is on the disclosures at the time of filing and whether they are sufficient 
to warrant the claim.212 In contrast, § 101 is focused on preventing 
further innovation from being hindered by a claim of a 
“fundamental . . . building block[] of human thought.”213 
Despite the history of this test, the Supreme Court does not appear 
ready to fully accept it.214 However, to some degree, while it has been 
accepted and used by the Court, the test is vague and undefined in its 
current form. The multiple factors set forth in Life After Bilski provide 
a reasonable starting point to define the test, although some factors—
such as the inventor’s contribution relative to the prior art—are just as 
vague as the original test. Such factors are easy to determine in 
hindsight, but do not easily lend themselves to an ad hoc evaluation. 
E.   Current Direction 
It was against this chaotic background that the Federal Circuit 
decided both CLS Bank v. Alice Corporation215 and Bancorp Services 
v. Sun Life. 216  Both cases provide a brief glimpse into the next 
generation of factors that may be used by the court. 
                                                                                                                 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Lemley et al., supra note 9, at 1329–32. 
 212. Id. at 1330 (“First, § 112 merely examines whether the disclosure is sufficient to warrant the 
claims.”). 
 213. Id. at 1328. 
 214. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 (2012) (noting that a 
broadness analysis is a relative test since even a narrow law of nature could prevent further innovation). 
 215. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 685 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir.), vacated, 484 F. App’x 
559 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 216. Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
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1.   Practicality 
In Alice, the court considered if the invention would prove useful 
from a practical standpoint.217 However, practicality and usefulness 
were not enough to ultimately pull the court away from its familiarity 
with the machine-or-transformation test, which it would rely upon to 
determine the outcome.218 The basis for practicality is that an abstract 
idea is not useful without some practical application. 219  When 
reviewing an invention for patentability, the court should focus on the 
practical application portion of the patent. Unfortunately, in Alice, the 
court did not spend much time on this concept before deeming it too 
abstract and retreating back to the machine-or-transformation test.220 
While the court gave little reasoning for rejecting the practicality 
test, it is not hard to understand why this is the right conclusion. First, 
the concept of usefulness is almost as hard to define as the concept of 
abstractness. As the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court have 
acknowledged, all inventions could be ultimately stripped down to an 
unpatentable subject matter, whether it is an abstract idea, law of 
nature, or natural phenomenon.221 In addition, the courts have rejected 
a part of the idea of usefulness,222 and the remaining parts of the 
usefulness test are applied as the substantial utility test.223 While both 
                                                                                                                 
 217. Alice, 685 F.3d at 1355. The Federal Circuit looked to its precedent and found the requirement of 
practicality and believed the invention before it was a “practical application of a business concept.” Id. 
 218. Id. at 1356. The court found that the use of a machine in this invention prevented a finding of 
ineligibility under § 101, but noted that it could still be invalid under other provisions of the statute. Id. 
 219. Id. at 1349 (“This court has also attempted to define ‘abstract ideas,’ explaining that ‘abstract ideas 
constitute disembodied concepts or truths which are not “useful” from a practical standpoint standing 
alone, i.e., they are not “useful” until reduced to some practical application.’”) (quoting In re Alappat, 33 
F.3d 1526, 1542 n.18 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
 220. Id. (“Notwithstanding these well-intentioned efforts and the great volume of pages in the Federal 
Reporters treating the abstract ideas exception, the dividing line between inventions that are directed to 
patent ineligible abstract ideas and those that are not remains elusive.”). 
 221. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012) (“For all 
inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or 
abstract ideas.”). 
 222. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc. 185 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The Federal Circuit 
rejected the morality requirement set forth by Justice Story, claiming such a requirement was no longer 
the law and had not been so for decades. Id. at 1366–67. The courts used the morality requirement to deny 
patents to those inventions that failed to meet public policy or morality aspects of the utility requirement. 
Cynthia M. Ho, Splicing Morality and Patent Law: Issues Arising from Mixing Mice and Men, 2 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 247, 248 (2000). 
 223. The substantial utility test requires a process to be developed to the point that a specific benefit 
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tests—utility and abstractness—originate in § 101, they are different 
and separate tests. However, if the Supreme Court continues on its 
current path of absorbing all other Title 35 tests into § 101,224 then this 
test for practicality will most likely persist and be adopted by the Court 
as well. 
2.   Sufficient Machine Limitation 
Where Alice looked to utility, Bancorp took the machine prong of 
the machine-or-transformation test and focused almost exclusively on 
whether the machine sufficiently limited the invention.225 The court 
required the computer to be integral to each claim, but—finding 
insufficient support for this limitation226—the court looked to see if the 
claims presented any additional features.227 Finding neither integral 
computer restrictions nor additional features, the Federal Circuit found 
the claims invalid as abstract ideas.228 
In anticipation of comparison between the two cases, the Federal 
Circuit claimed the conclusion in Bancorp was consistent with the 
holding in Alice. 229  The Bancorp court made an effort to draw a 
comparison between its decision and the conclusion in Alice. 230 
                                                                                                                 
exists in the invention’s current form. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966). 
 224. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1276–77 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (rejecting the 
concept that § 101 should encompass novelty and obviousness tests which are properties of §§ 102 and 
103). 
 225. Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(“The district court correctly held that without the computer limitations nothing remains in the claims but 
the abstract idea of managing a stable value protected life insurance policy by performing calculations 
and manipulating the results. . . . Bancorp asserts that its claims are not abstract because they are limited 
to use in the life insurance market. In Bilski the Supreme Court discredited a similar argument . . . .”). 
 226. Id. at 1279 (“It is the management of the life insurance policy that is ‘integral to each of 
[Bancorp’s] claims at issue,’ not the computer machinery that may be used to accomplish it.”). 
 227. Id. (“When the insignificant computer-based limitations are set aside from those claims that 
contain such limitations, the question under § 101 reduces to an analysis of what additional features 
remain in the claims.”). 
 228. Id. at 1281. 
 229. Id. at 1280. As the court noted, the two cases were handled at essentially the same time—Alice 
was decided shortly after the oral arguments in Bancorp were heard. Id. at 1280. The court released both 
decisions in the same month. Not only does the timing provide critics reason to compare the cases, but the 
similarity between subject matter further encourages comparison. See generally id.; CLS Bank Int’l v. 
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 685 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir.), vacated, 484 F. App’x 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 230. Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1280–81 (“[O]ur conclusion is not inconsistent with CLS, which we decided 
after hearing oral arguments in this appeal. . . . [U]nlike in CLS, the claims here are not directed to a ‘very 
specific application’ of the inventive concept; as noted, Bancorp seeks to broadly claim the unpatentable 
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Despite these attempts, the patent community has already started to 
criticize the courts for being inconsistent.231  After the decision in 
Bancorp, CLS Bank filed a petition for rehearing en banc claiming the 
two decisions were wholly inconsistent.232 The Federal Circuit agreed 
enough to vacate Alice and request new briefs and oral arguments.233 
III.   A PATH FORWARD 
In its order vacating the case of CLS Bank v. Alice Corporation, the 
Federal Circuit requested that both parties submit briefs proposing 
which test the court should adopt to determine whether an invention is 
an abstract idea or is directed to eligible subject matter.234 As noted, 
the court has attempted to adopt a number of tests with only limited 
success.235 This latest request is another attempt at crafting a test that 
the Supreme Court will accept as a threshold test for identifying 
patentable subject matter. With an examination of the factors used by 
the courts complete, this Note proposes a new test for patentability 
based on this examination in section A, and discusses the future of the 
machine-or-transformation test in section B. In section C, this Note 
applies this new test to three historical cases as an example of the 
application. 
                                                                                                                 
abstract concept of managing a stable value protected life insurance policy.”). 
 231. Crouch, supra note 7 (“Despite this attempted reconciliation, it is clear that the CLS majority has 
a different approach to subject matter eligibility questions.”). But see David Kappos, Some Thoughts on 
Patentability, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE (July 27, 2012), http://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/ 
entry/some_thoughts_on_patentability (“Hopefully, the guidance supplied by the Federal Circuit in CLS 
Bank can help us as we continue to work on reducing pendency and enhancing quality of issued patents.”). 
 232. Petition for Rehearing En Banc, CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (No. 2011-1301), 2012 WL 3986423, at *10–11 (arguing the decision in Bancorp while consistent 
with other contemporary cases, is not reconcilable with the holding in Alice.) 
 233. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 484 F. App’x 559, 559–60 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The court 
requested that both parties address two questions: (1) “[w]hat test should the court adopt to determine 
whether a computer-implemented invention is a patent ineligible ‘abstract idea’; and when, if ever, does 
the presence of a computer in a claim lend patent eligibility to an otherwise patent-ineligible idea?”; and 
(2) “[i]n assessing patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of a computer-implemented invention, should 
it matter whether the invention is claimed as a method, system, or storage medium; and should such claims 
at times be considered equivalent for § 101 purposes?” Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. See supra note 4. 
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A.   ICoMSE 
The ICoMSE236 test proposed here is a three-factor test that balances 
the presence of an inventive concept, the amount of market success 
achieved by the invention, and the number of embodiments disclosed. 
Next, this Note explores each factor in more depth. 
1.   Inventive Concept 
The ICoMSE should incorporate the inventive concept from Parker 
v. Flook as its first factor.237 As the Court in Flook described it, the 
inventive concept is “‘a novel and useful structure created with the aid 
of knowledge of scientific truth . . . .’”238 Although Flook used the 
inventive concept as a definitive test, the mere presence of an inventive 
concept should not be enough to salvage a patent on an otherwise 
abstract idea. Similar to the Supreme Court’s discussion regarding a 
broadness test in Prometheus,239 the presence of an inventive concept 
should be a relative factor, determined by considering the likelihood 
that the invention will preempt the underlying concept. In addition, this 
factor should be weighed in conjunction with other factors. If an 
inventive concept is present, it should move the decision toward 
patentability, but the remaining factors are required to complete the 
analysis. 
2.   Market Success 
The next factor evaluates the invention’s success in the marketplace. 
Commercial success is an indicator of whether the application is useful 
and needed by the public. A more practical application,240 one that is 
less abstract, will normally fulfill a need of the market, and thereby, 
enjoy more commercial success. The courts already consider how 
                                                                                                                 
 236. The acronym ICoMSE is derived from the factors: Inventive Concept, Market Success, and 
number of Embodiments. 
 237. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978). 
 238. Id. at 591. 
 239. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1300–01 (2012) 
(commenting that even a test such as claim broadness has its limitations). 
 240. The Federal Circuit instructs that an abstract idea is not useful until it is reduced to a practical 
application. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1542 n.18 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
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successful an invention is, as a secondary consideration for 
obviousness. 241  Using this factor, the courts would evaluate the 
invention’s success in the market as an indication of whether it is more 
abstract or more practical. The courts can use much of the existing case 
law, such as requiring a nexus between licenses and commercial 
success,242 to complete this analysis. Unfortunately, this factor will be 
the hardest one to evaluate. Courts must examine commercial success 
after the market has a chance to utilize the invention.243 The courts can 
analyze venture capital funding, licensing deals, and other pre-sale 
activity and use that analysis to estimate the amount of market success 
an invention will achieve. 
3.   Number of Embodiments 
As one of the factors in the Life After Bilski test,244 and one of the 
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112,245 a factor that evaluates the number 
of embodiments disclosed by the invention is relatively well-defined. 
Embodiment is the “tangible manifestation of an invention.”246 Under 
§ 112, multiple embodiments are required when an invention attempts 
to claim an entire genus.247 Similarly, the broader a claim is over an 
abstract idea, the more embodiments the invention must disclose. Life 
after Bilski suggests that this analysis should be conducted after all the 
others because it is not a clear-cut analysis, instead relying on views 
of experts.248 However, because this factor is balanced against the 
other three factors, the court should analyze it simultaneously with 
them. The more embodiments an invention discloses, the more this 
                                                                                                                 
 241. Secondary considerations include “commercial success, long felt but unresolved needs, failure of 
others, etc.” Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). Other considerations are 
regularly proposed for adoption by the courts. Natalie A. Thomas, Note, Secondary Considerations in 
Nonobviousness Analysis: The Use of Objective Indica Following KSR v. Teleflex, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
2070, 2076 (2011). 
 242. Iron Grip Barbell Co. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 243. But by definition, this creates a bias against non-operating patent trolls, or companies that collect 
patents but only use them for litigation purposes. 
 244. Lemley et al., supra note 9, at 1329–32. 
 245. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
 246. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 599. 
 247. “[I]t has been consistently held that the naming of one member of such a group is not, in itself, a 
proper basis for a claim to the entire group.” In re Grimme, 274 F.2d 949, 952 (C.C.P.A. 1960). 
 248. Lemley et al., supra note 9, at 1345. 
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factor weighs in favor of patentability. In contrast, when the invention 
discloses fewer embodiments, the remaining factors will have to 
support a more critical review. The number of inventions required to 
justify patentability will determine the weight of the other factors, as 
well as the broadness of the patent claims—a fact and circumstances 
test for the courts. 
B.   The Future of the Machine-or-Transformation Test 
The Supreme Court made it clear that the machine-or-
transformation test is not the sole test for determining patentability.249 
However, the Court has continued to affirm the test as an “important 
and useful clue.” 250  While the test has received its share of 
criticisms,251 this is in part because the Federal Circuit continues to 
extend it beyond its limits. The machine-or-transformation test should 
continue to exist as a tool for the courts in determining patentability. 
As one tool, the courts should use the machine-or-transformation test 
in the right situation, while other tests, such as the one set forth in the 
Life after Bilski or the one this Note presents, can be used in other 
situations, each based on the test’s strengths. The courts can continue 
to use the machine-or-transformation test in the event that a machine, 
such as a GPS unit, 252 limits the invention or the invention affects a 
transformation as in the manufacturing of fat acids.253 Similarly, the 
courts can apply the scope-broadness test or the test proposed by this 
Note, if adopted, in other situations that do not fit neatly into the 
machine-or-transformation niche. With the variety of inventions, and 
methods for drafting claims, each test can have its place in a court’s 
toolbox. As inventions move further away from a tangible process as 
industrial manufacturing, the machine-or-transformation test may see 
less use, but it should not be overturned for the mere fact it has been 
over-used in the past. 
                                                                                                                 
 249. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 (2012); Bilski v. 
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010). 
 250. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1303. 
 251. Lemley et al., supra note 9, at 1316. 
 252. See generally SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 253. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972). 
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C.   Application 
To demonstrate how ICoMSE can be used by the courts, this section 
applies to the facts of three cases—Bancorp Services v. Sun Life 
because the Federal Circuit recently decided this case, Parker v. Flook 
due to its reputation for being poorly decided,254 and Diamond v. Diehr 
as a contrast to Flook, both in terms of reasoning and outcome. In each, 
the discussion ignores the machine-or-transformation test, as well the 
dilemma over whether the courts should apply ICoMSE or the 
machine-or-transformation test in each case. While this Note does not 
advocate the repeal of the machine-or-transformation test, its 
application is not the focus of the test. 
1.   Bancorp Services, L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. 
To apply the test, the court should first determine if the invention at 
issue—the life insurance administration system 255 —contains an 
inventive concept. In Bancorp, the Federal Circuit did much of this 
analysis already. It searched for and was unable to find any inventive 
concept.256 Instead, it found an implementation of an algorithm—an 
implementation that was not tied to a computer.257 Therefore, the first 
factor of the inventive concept is lacking in this invention. This factor 
will weigh against the validity of the patent. 
Next, the court should consider the number of embodiments. The 
Bancorp case considered two patents.258 Each patent disclosed only 
one embodiment.259 While this is sufficient for the application, it does 
little to increase the likelihood that the invention is not abstract. This 
factor will also weigh against the validity of the patent. 
                                                                                                                 
 254. Lemley et al., supra note 9, at 1335–36 (noting that the Flook case had doctrinal problems but 
reached the right result because it agreed with the authors’ proposed test). 
 255. Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
See also supra note 138. 
 256. Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1280–81 (stating that the claims were not directed to an application of an 
inventive concept, resulting in a finding of invalidity of the patent). 
 257. Id. at 1280. 
 258. Id. at 1269. 
 259. Id. at 1270–72. 
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Finally, the court should evaluate the market success of the 
invention. While the record is silent as to this factor, Bancorp was 
suing Sun Life for infringement,260 implying a level of market success. 
When another company is using the patent through a license or 
infringement, the invention is fulfilling a need. Unless additional 
information negates this conclusion, this factor will weigh in favor of 
patent validity. 
In sum, the factors weigh against a finding of patent validity, a 
finding that mirrors the Federal Circuit’s ruling.261 
2.   Parker v. Flook 
Similarly, the Court in Flook makes the analysis of the first factor, 
the inventive concept, relatively easy. In Flook, the Supreme Court 
searched the patent claims for an inventive concept but found none.262 
Unfortunately, the post-solution activity in Flook was not enough to 
transform the subject matter of the invention from a mathematical 
formula to patent-eligible subject matter.263 In the case of Flook, the 
inventive concept factor again weighs against patentability. 
While the patent office never issued the final patent for the 
application in Flook, the claims were included in the Court’s 
opinion.264 Here again, the application only disclosed one embodiment 
of the invention.265 Unlike in Bancorp where the patent was issued,266 
the disclosed embodiment in Flook was not enough to convince even 
the patent office of the invention’s patentability.267 Again, this factor 
weighs against patentability. 
                                                                                                                 
 260. Id. at 1272. 
 261. Id. at 1281. 
 262. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) (“Respondent’s process is unpatentable under § 101, 
not because it contains a mathematical algorithm as one component, but because once that algorithm is 
assumed to be within the prior art, the application, considered as a whole, contains no patentable 
invention.”). 
 263. Id. at 594–95. 
 264. Id. at 596–97. 
 265. Id. (describing the invention and listing only one disclosed embodiment in the submitted patent 
application). 
 266. Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1269. 
 267. Flook, 437 U.S. at 587. 
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In evaluating market success for Flook, the facts of the case provide 
little useful information. This was not a case of infringement, but a 
situation in which the inventor was appealing a patent application’s 
denial.268 Accordingly, there is no discussion of the invention’s effect 
on the market, and the resulting success or failure. Without additional 
information, it is impossible to conclude whether the invention in 
Flook would have been commercially successful. 
With two of the three factors weighing against patentability, and the 
third being inconclusive, this invention also fails this test for 
patentability. 
3.   Diamond v. Diehr 
Again in Diehr, the Court’s analysis provides the analysis for the 
first prong, the inventive concept. While in Diehr, the majority 
refrained from using the term “inventive concept,” the same post-
solution activity the Court used to find patentability also qualifies as 
an inventive concept.269 To find patentability, the Court ignored the 
formula the invention incorporated, and looked at the additional 
activity to determine if the invention contained any patentable subject 
matter.270  The courts must follow this same procedure in order to 
determine if the invention includes an inventive concept. Since the 
Court did find the post-solution activity was enough to justify 
patentability, it is enough to satisfy the inventive concept factor. 
Again in Diehr, the invention discloses only one embodiment.271 
While this meets the requirements for a patent application, it only does 
the bare minimum required. With only one embodiment disclosed, the 
invention does not satisfy the second factor, otherwise, this factor 
would weigh in favor of every patent, making it a useless prong. Only 
with multiple embodiments does this factor start to weigh in favor of 
patentability, and the greater the number of embodiments, the more it 
                                                                                                                 
 268. Id. 
 269. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–93 (1981). 
 270. Id. The Court worked through the analysis of insufficient post-solution activity but ultimately 
concluded that the activity here was patentable. Id. 
 271. U.S. Patent No. 4,334,142 (filed Aug. 20, 1980). The Diehr Court did not discuss the claims of the 
patent in detail and was silent as to the number of embodiments. See generally Diehr, 450 U.S. 175. 
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favors patentability. Without multiple embodiment disclosures, the 
second prong weighs against a finding of patentability for the Diehr 
invention. 
Similar to Flook, the invention in Diehr was not an issued patent, 
but an appeal of the rejection of an application.272 This again means 
that the invention achieved limited commercial success. However, in 
this case, the inventor would have implemented the invention for a 
production process, providing Diehr’s employer, and patent 
transferee,273 a competitive advantage. While not conclusive, these 
facts provide a slight weighting for a conclusion of patentability. 
In total, two of the three factors favor patentability, although one 
only marginally so. The ICoMSE test draws from the wide history of 
patent law in order to incorporate factors that address concerns of the 
courts and the patent community. The first factor, the inventive 
concept, is taken from the history of the patentability test.274  The 
second factor, market success, is derived from the related history of 
obviousness testing.275 And finally, the third factor, the number of 
embodiments, comes from commentators in the patent community.276 
CONCLUSION 
It is a safe bet that the boundaries of the abstract idea exclusion to 
patentable subject matter will continue to elude both inventors and the 
courts. While finding the machine-or-transformation test insufficient 
for modern inventions,277 the Supreme Court continues to reject new 
tests of patentability.278 Courts should avoid abandoning the machine-
or-transformation test altogether, but should limit its use to situations 
in which the invention incorporates a machine limitation or affects a 
                                                                                                                 
 272. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 181. 
 273. U.S. Patent No. 4,334,142 (filed Aug. 20, 1980) (noting that Federal-Mogul Corporation of 
Southfield, Mich. is the assignee). 
 274. See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
 275. See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
 276. See discussion supra Part III.A.3. 
 277. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 278. See discussion supra Part II. 
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transformation.279 For the remaining situations, the courts need a new 
test; one that evaluates the patentability based on several factors, 
drawing cues from the market, public policy, and existing court 
doctrine. ICoMSE evaluates patentability based on the presence of an 
inventive concept, the market success of the invention, and the number 
of embodiments disclosed.280 This will provide the courts with another 
test for patentability, one that has learned from the precedents of the 
Supreme Court and takes cues from the market. 
                                                                                                                 
 279. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 280. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
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